UK Migration — Housing Supply
A standalone analysis of the relationship between migration and the UK housing crisis. What the data does show about migration's contribution to housing pressure, what it does not, who actually receives social housing, what the public-opinion data shows about the salience-accuracy gap, and what the evidence implies for housing policy.
20. Housing Supply and Migration
What this section is
The most politically salient migration argument in 2024-2026 is housing. This section presents the comprehensive evidence on the housing-migration interaction, drawing on the Social Housing & Migration in England — Complete Evidence Review (April 2026, 77 primary sources, compiled through AI-assisted research using only published primary sources). That report's findings are integrated here with appropriate attribution; the underlying data sources (MHCLG CORE, ONS Census 2021, Migration Observatory, OBR, MAC, DWP, House of Commons Library, NatCen) are cited throughout.
The section addresses both the question that has dominated public debate (do migrants get social housing ahead of British citizens?) and the broader structural question (how does migration interact with the UK housing crisis?).
The structural backdrop
England has approximately 4.3 million social homes in 2024 — 1.2 million fewer than in 1981, when the stock peaked at around 5.5 million. The decline reflects three factors: sales under Right to Buy (at least 1.9 million homes since 1980); Large Scale Voluntary Transfers to housing associations; and persistently low rates of new social housing construction.
The National Housing Federation estimates 90,000 new social rent homes per year are needed for 15 years to meet backlog demand; in recent years, councils have delivered fewer than 8,000 annually. The Affordable Homes Programme 2026–2036 aims for 300,000 affordable homes, of which at least 180,000 would be for social rent — but this remains dependent on delivery.
At 31 March 2025:
- 1.34 million households were on housing registers (highest since 2014, up from ~1.04 million in 2010)
- ~550,000 were classified as 'in reasonable preference' (priority) categories
- National average wait: 2.9 years; in London >10 years for larger properties
- New lettings: ~263,000 per year (only 6% of stock turns over annually)
Temporary accommodation has become the most visible symptom of the supply crisis:
- 130,890 households in TA at 31 March 2025 (record high; +11.5% YoY)
- 72,680 of those households included children
- Council spending on TA: £2.84 billion in 2024/25 (+25% YoY, +118% over five years)
These are the structural facts within which migration's interaction with housing must be understood.
Who actually receives social housing
CORE (Continuous Recording of Lettings) is the government's complete census of new social housing lettings in England. It has been published annually since 2008/09 and is the only individual-level dataset on social housing lettings.
| Year | Lettings | UK nationals | EEA | Non-EEA | Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008/09 | 330,000 | 94.1% | 2.0% | 3.0% | CORE series begins |
| 2013/14 | 287,000 | 92.6% | 4.3% | 3.3% | EEA peak |
| 2019/20 | 281,000 | 92.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% | Pre-pandemic baseline |
| 2022/23 | 252,000 | 90.0% | 4.0% | 6.0% | Afghan/Ukraine drives non-EEA rise |
| 2023/24 | 261,000 | 87.0% | 4.0% | 9.0% | Non-EEA peak at 9% |
| 2024/25 | 263,000 | 88.6% | 4.0% | 8.0% | Most recent (MHCLG Nov 2025) |
The UK national share has remained in the range 88–94% throughout. There is no period in which non-UK nationals have come close to receiving a majority — or even a substantial minority — of new lettings.
The non-EEA share roughly doubled between 2020 and 2024 (3% to 8-9%), driven primarily by Afghan resettlement (post-Taliban, August 2021) and Ukrainian humanitarian schemes (from February 2022). These are government-managed resettlement programmes, not independent arrivals through the asylum system.
The non-EEA share fell slightly from 9% to 8% in 2024/25 as Ukrainian lettings moderated.
CORE captures annual flows. Census 2021 provides the stock view:
- 7% of social housing residents held a non-UK passport in 2021 (up from 5% in 2011)
- 15% of social housing residents were born outside the UK (against ~16% foreign-born share of general population)
- The foreign-born are not over-represented in social housing relative to their population share
- Foreign-born arrivals who have since naturalised appear as UK nationals in CORE but as foreign-born in Census data
| Area | Foreign-born HRP share of social housing |
|---|---|
| England & Wales | 19.2% |
| London | 47.6% |
| Birmingham | 25.1% |
| Manchester | 25.6% |
| Leicester | 29.8% |
The London figure has attracted particular attention. Important context: 'foreign-born' includes people who arrived decades ago and have since naturalised. When the narrower 'non-UK passport' measure is used, London's non-UK share is substantially lower than 47.6%. London hosts 40%+ of all foreign-born residents of England; its housing profile reflects its demographic profile, not preferential allocation.
Legal eligibility: who can apply
Access to social housing is governed primarily by Part VI of the Housing Act 1996 and section 115 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Two gatekeeping stages: eligibility (set nationally) and qualification (set locally). The legal barriers are already extensive.
| Status | Access |
|---|---|
| UK citizen / ILR / naturalised | YES — full access |
| Refugee / Humanitarian Protection | YES — from date of grant |
| Afghan ARAP/ACRS resettlement | YES — government scheme |
| Ukrainian humanitarian visa | YES — if Homes for Ukraine host ends |
| EU Settled Status | YES (with conditions on right to reside) |
| EU Pre-Settled Status | YES (must demonstrate right to reside) |
| Work visa (Skilled Worker, H&C) | NO — NRPF, ~1.5m people |
| Student visa | NO — NRPF, ~600,000 people |
| Most family visas | NO — NRPF, ~500,000 people |
| Asylum seeker (claim pending) | NO — Home Office NASS, separate |
| Undocumented / overstayer | NO — no public funds |
The NRPF condition is the mechanism that bars most recent migrants. Approximately 3.6 million people held visas with a standard NRPF condition at end-2024. Adding asylum caseload (~225,000) and estimated undocumented population (594,000–745,000), the total NRPF-equivalent population could be 4–4.5 million. The Home Office does not maintain a central NRPF register, creating data uncertainty.
Local qualification tests: 89% of English local authorities operate local connection and/or residency tests under powers granted by the Localism Act 2011. Some require one year's local connection; others require three or five years. The Conservative government consulted in January 2024 on a proposed mandatory 10-year UK connection test for non-UK/non-EEA nationals; the Labour government rejected this in September 2024.
The system extensively gatekeeps access by immigration status. The legal barriers are already substantial.
Refugees and resettlement
Refugee households as a share of new social housing lettings:
| Year | Refugee lettings | % of total |
|---|---|---|
| 2014/15 | 1,400 | 0.4% |
| 2020/21 | 2,500 | 1.2% |
| 2022/23 | 3,100 | 1.2% |
| 2023/24 | 4,100 | 2.0% |
| 2024/25 | 4,700 | 2.3% |
The 2024/25 picture in detail:
- 35,700 Afghans resettled under ARAP, ACRS and associated routes by March 2025
- 223,000 Ukrainians arrived under Homes for Ukraine and Ukraine Family schemes (~130,000 remain)
- Afghan lettings 2024/25: 1,300 (0.6% of total)
- Ukrainian lettings 2024/25: 1,100 (0.5% of total)
Resettlement scheme participants are placed directly into social housing or other accommodation by local authorities, partly funded by central government grant. This is a direct government policy decision, not a product of the general waiting list.
The asylum system is entirely separate. Asylum seekers awaiting a decision are housed by the Home Office through NASS — in contracted hotels, disused military sites, or other accommodation. This is explicitly not social housing stock. The government has confirmed to Full Fact: "social housing stock is not used to accommodate supported asylum seekers."
The "move-on" period when refugees are granted status creates a documented pressure point: 28-day requirement to vacate Home Office accommodation (extended to 56 days for vulnerable groups under a December 2024 pilot). 13,190 households received local authority homelessness assistance after leaving asylum accommodation in the 12 months to March 2025. This is a real link between the asylum system and mainstream housing services — but it flows from the design of the asylum support system, not from asylum seekers accessing social housing while claims are pending.
What the data shows about migration's contribution to the housing crisis
Migration is one of multiple demand drivers, not the primary one.
Migration Observatory analysis estimates migration accounts for approximately 30-40% of net housing demand growth in England, with the remainder driven by household formation effects (smaller average household sizes), internal migration, and second-home dynamics. London migration share of demand growth is higher (perhaps 50-60%); rural Wales and Scotland lower.
The 2022-2024 net migration peak coincides with the period of sharpest rent acceleration — average UK rents rose approximately 30% between 2021 and 2025, outpacing earnings growth substantially. Causal attribution is contested but the temporal correlation is strong.
The Bank of England 2024 staff working paper on migration and housing finds migration has measurable upward pressure on rents in receiving areas, with the effect concentrated at the lower end of the rental market and stronger where supply is highly inelastic (most of South East England). The effect on owner-occupier prices is smaller.
Migration also contributes to housing supply. Construction sector workforce data (CITB, Federation of Master Builders) shows substantial migrant share of skilled trades workforce. The May 2025 White Paper RQF Level 6 threshold removes some construction roles from sponsored migration eligibility; the Temporary Shortage List mechanism may restore flexibility. The net housing effect of migration is therefore demand-positive (more people need housing) and supply-positive (more workforce builds housing). The net is contested but the demand effect is widely assessed as larger than the supply effect at current scales.
Tenancy fraud is a substantial and under-discussed factor. The Tenancy Fraud Forum (2023) estimates approximately 148,000 social homes are fraudulently occupied in England, at a cost of up to £2 billion per year. If recovered, these would add the equivalent of 56% to annual new lettings supply. There is no national data linking tenancy fraud perpetrators to nationality or immigration status; the scale is estimated, the composition unknown. This is a structural delivery failure independent of migration policy.
Universal Credit by immigration status
In July 2025, DWP published the first-ever breakdown of Universal Credit claimants by immigration status — a significant new dataset.
| Group | Claimants (June 2025) | % of total |
|---|---|---|
| UK / Irish nationals | 6.6 million | 83.6% |
| Non-UK/Irish — total | 1.26 million | 16.4% |
| — EU Settled Status | 770,000 | 9.7% |
| — Indefinite Leave to Remain | 211,000 | 2.7% |
| — Other | 279,000 | 3.5% |
UK and Irish nationals account for 83.6% of all Universal Credit claimants — broadly consistent with their population share. EU nationals with settled status account for 9.7% — the largest non-UK group, reflecting the large EU population with permanent right to reside. The £10.1 billion annual UC payment to non-UK/Irish nationals (2024) represents 16% of UC spend — similar to non-UK nationals' share of the working-age population.
NRPF visa holders are explicitly excluded from UC.
Public opinion: the salience-accuracy gap
The data on public opinion reveals a persistent gap between salience and accuracy:
| Finding | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Immigration as top public concern (Aug 2025) | 48% | Ipsos Issues Index |
| Public estimate: asylum as % of immigration | 33% | British Future/Ipsos Jul 2025 |
| Actual: asylum as % of immigration | 14% | ONS migration statistics |
| Think net migration INCREASED last year (it halved) | 56% | British Future/Ipsos |
| Migrants enriched country culturally | 41% | NatCen BSA 2025 |
| 'Balancer Middle' (mixed views) | 49% | British Future/Ipsos 2025 |
| 'Migration Sceptics' (strongly negative) | 28% | British Future/Ipsos |
| 'Migration Liberals' (strongly positive) | 18% | British Future/Ipsos |
| Local area housing 'more than fair share' of asylum seekers | 31% | Ipsos Aug 2025 |
The 'Balancer Middle' (49%) is the largest group: mixed views, recognising both pressures and gains, supporting managed migration for work and study, opposing 'uncontrolled' small boat crossings. When presented with specific trade-offs, they do not favour positions that would significantly increase homelessness or remove needed workers. Only 19% of the public overall say too much legal migration is a top concern.
The salience-accuracy gap matters: the perception that asylum seekers are housed in social housing is specifically incorrect — they are barred by law and housed separately. Public debate that does not address this misperception is debating an arrangement that does not exist.
Devolved nations comparison
| Nation | Social stock % | RTB status | Stock trend |
|---|---|---|---|
| England | 16% | Reformed 2024 | Falling |
| Scotland | 23% | Abolished July 2016 | Rising since 2018 |
| Wales | ~16% | Ended 2019 | Stable |
| N. Ireland | ~16% | Limited — still exists | Stable |
Scotland provides the most instructive contrast with England. Since abolishing Right to Buy for new applications in July 2016, Scotland's social housing stock has grown every year since 2018, reaching 633,030 dwellings at March 2024 — 23% of total housing stock against England's 16%. In 2023/24, 25,423 permanent lettings were made, of which 49% went to homeless households. Scotland does not publish nationality breakdowns of new lettings comparable to England's CORE system.
Conclusions
On the specific question that triggered this evidence review (whether social housing is being systematically diverted from UK nationals to recent migrants): the evidence does not support that claim. UK nationals receive 89% of new lettings. Non-UK nationals — predominantly those granted refugee status or resettlement rights — receive 11%. The non-UK share has risen since 2021 due to specific government decisions to resettle Afghans and Ukrainians.
On the legal framework: the barriers are already substantial. ~3.6 million people on work, student and family visas are legally barred from social housing by NRPF. Asylum seekers are housed in a separate Home Office system at a cost of £4 billion per year. 89% of councils operate local connection or residency tests.
On the housing crisis: the primary driver of waiting list length, the temporary accommodation crisis (£2.84bn in 2024/25), and the housing affordability problem is structural undersupply — 1.2 million social homes lost since 1981, and chronic under-construction. Immigration accounts for approximately one-third of projected household growth; significant, but not the majority. Even zero migration would not resolve the supply gap.
On data accuracy and public debate: the public significantly overestimates asylum's role in immigration and the extent to which migrants access social housing. Addressing these misperceptions is relevant to productive policy debate.
On policy implications: the evidence does not dictate a single answer. Multiple decisions — Right to Buy, planning constraints, insufficient new build, the design of the asylum support system — have contributed to the housing crisis. These are policy questions on which the data is relevant but does not itself dictate a single direction.
Data gaps: length of time in the UK is not captured by CORE (the data point that triggered this review); individual nationality breakdown beyond UK/EEA/non-EEA is collected but not routinely published; tenancy fraud nationality breakdown is not published; long-term social housing outcomes by nationality are not tracked at individual level; private rental sector immigration impact is the least researched tenure.
Section 20 substantially based on the Social Housing & Migration in England — Complete Evidence Review (April 2026), an independent evidence assessment compiled through AI-assisted research from 77 primary sources. Original sources cited throughout; the underlying primary sources (MHCLG CORE, ONS Census 2021, Migration Observatory, OBR, MAC, DWP, House of Commons Library, NatCen, Full Fact) verify each finding.